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№ 175 Case Study — Buying & Selling a Business

A family storage-facility purchase and the insurance clock nobody watched

Days before closing on a Hamilton self-storage facility, a family buying team discovered the tenant insurance program their own advisor had cleared was about to lapse with no replacement in place.

Buying & Selling a Business8 min readHamilton, OntarioSelf-storage facility sales
All Buying & Selling a Business case studies
ClientCristina and Jacek, a family buying a self-storage facility together in Hamilton
The issueThe facility's tenant insurance program was set to lapse at closing with no continuity plan in place
ServiceReviewed the insurance program structure, renegotiated closing terms, and arranged a bridging solution
ResolutionClosing proceeded on revised terms with a short negotiated gap the parties shared the cost of covering

The situation

Nine days before closing, Cristina's accountant forwarded an email he had been sitting on for two weeks: a notice from the facility's insurance provider stating that the master tenant insurance program covering the storage units would terminate on the closing date unless a new policyholder was named in advance. Nobody had flagged it as urgent. It landed on our desk with the closing calendar already locked.

Cristina, a dentist who owned her own practice, and her husband Jacek had agreed to buy a mid-sized self-storage facility in Hamilton from Wojciech, a retired business owner who had run it for close to two decades. The purchase price sat in the five-to-eight million dollar range, and the plan was for the couple to operate it together as a family business, with Jacek leaving his own work to manage it day to day.

Self-storage facilities like this one typically run a tenant insurance program as a condition of the lease: every renter storing goods on site is required to carry contents coverage, usually sold through a master policy the facility operator arranges and administers, with a share of the premium flowing back to the operator as revenue. It is a meaningful piece of the business's income, and just as importantly, it is the thing standing between the operator and a very large liability if a fire, flood or theft wipes out hundreds of tenants' belongings at once.

The purchase agreement had been drafted months earlier by Cristina's first advisor, a deal consultant she and Jacek had hired to manage the acquisition before either side of the family had legal counsel involved. That advisor had reviewed the facility's financials, walked the property, and signed off on the deal structure without ever asking who held the insurance program's underlying contract or what happened to it on a change of ownership. By the time we were retained to handle the closing, the answer was already a problem: the program was written to the seller personally, not to the corporation being sold, and it did not transfer automatically.

Wojciech had built the tenant insurance program himself, years earlier, as a side arrangement with an insurer he had known personally, and it had never occurred to him that a sale would require anything more than handing over the tenant list. He was not trying to hide anything; the program simply predated any of the paperwork that governed the sale, and it had grown into the business quietly enough that even his own lawyer had not flagged it as a separate asset requiring its own transfer mechanics. That gap in awareness on both sides is what let the issue sit unaddressed for months while the rest of the deal moved forward on schedule.

The complication

The insurer's position was straightforward and unmovable on short notice: the tenant insurance program was underwritten against Wojciech personally, not against the corporation being sold. On a share purchase like this one, the company keeps its own policies, subject to the insurer's right to be notified of a change of control and to re-underwrite or cancel, but this program had never belonged to the corporation in the first place. Because it was written to Wojciech as an individual, it could not follow the shares at all; the family needed their own application, underwriting, and policy, just as if this had been an asset purchase rather than a share sale. Underwriting a program covering several hundred individual tenant contents policies does not happen in nine days, particularly for a new operator with no claims history of their own.

That created two separate problems that had to be solved together. The first was revenue: the tenant insurance program generated a meaningful share of the facility's monthly income, and the financial projections Cristina and Jacek had relied on in agreeing to the price assumed that revenue continued uninterrupted. The second, larger problem was liability exposure. If the program lapsed even briefly, tenants storing goods at the facility would have no contents coverage in place, and depending on how their individual lease terms were written, the operator could end up holding the risk for any loss that occurred during the gap.

Wojciech's lawyer took the position that this was a closing-mechanics issue for the buyer to solve, not a defect in the deal itself, and technically that was defensible. The purchase agreement said nothing about insurance continuity because nobody had thought to put anything about it in. Cristina's original advisor had reviewed and approved a closing checklist that never asked the question, and by the time the gap surfaced, there was no clean contractual hook to force Wojciech to fix something the agreement never required of him.

Pushing the closing date back was the obvious first idea, and it lasted about a day. Wojciech had already committed the sale proceeds to a property purchase of his own with its own firm closing date, and delaying risked unwinding both transactions. The family, for their part, had given notice on Jacek's prior consulting arrangement and needed the facility operating on schedule. Neither side had real room to move the date, which meant the insurance gap had to be solved inside the existing timeline or not at all.

What we did

  1. Read the tenant leases before touching the insurance question, because the actual exposure depended on what several hundred individual lease agreements said about who bore the risk of an uninsured loss. We found that most leases placed responsibility for contents coverage on the tenant, not the facility, which meant the operator's exposure was narrower than the insurer's warning letter had made it sound, though not zero, and gave us a defensible starting position for negotiation rather than a guess.
  2. Contacted the insurer directly rather than relying on the broker's summary, and asked whether any short-form bridging coverage existed for exactly this situation, a change-of-ownership gap in an existing program. The insurer confirmed a thirty-day interim binder was available, at a materially higher rate, while full underwriting on the new ownership proceeded, which gave us a concrete option to bring back to the family instead of an open-ended problem.
  3. Quantified the interim binder's cost against the revenue the program generated, so the family understood in real numbers what a short gap or a bridged gap would actually cost them, rather than negotiating from an abstract fear of liability. This turned a values argument into a numbers argument, which moves faster and gave Cristina a figure she could weigh against walking away from the deal entirely.
  4. Went back to Wojciech's lawyer with the lease review and the binder quote in hand, framing the request narrowly: not a delay, not a price change, but a shared contribution to a thirty-day bridging cost that protected both sides, since Wojciech remained named on the lapsing program until the new one was approved and carried his own residual exposure until then.
  5. Negotiated a closing holdback equal to roughly half the bridging premium, released to the seller once the new tenant insurance program was confirmed active, giving Wojciech a direct incentive to cooperate with the insurer's underwriting requests rather than treating it as solely the buyer's problem once his proceeds had cleared.
  6. Amended the closing documents to record the holdback, the interim binder arrangement, and a short post-closing covenant requiring Wojciech to provide any historical claims information the new insurer needed to complete underwriting quickly, since incomplete claims history was the single biggest risk of underwriting delay.
  7. Coordinated directly with the insurer's underwriter in the final week to keep the new-owner application moving in parallel with closing, rather than waiting for closing to complete before starting it, which shaved measurable time off the gap the interim binder needed to cover and reduced the family's out-of-pocket bridging cost.
  8. Briefed the family in plain terms before closing day on exactly what the interim binder did and did not cover, so Cristina and Jacek understood the residual risk they were accepting for those final weeks and could decide, with full information, that it was a risk worth taking to close on schedule.

The outcome

The transaction closed on the original date. Tenant insurance ran on the interim binder for twenty-two days before the new program, underwritten to the family's ownership, went live. The family absorbed the incremental cost of the bridging coverage, split with Wojciech through the holdback, rather than losing the deal or closing with an uninsured gap they could not have justified to themselves once they understood the exposure.

It was not a clean win. The family paid more for insurance continuity than they had budgeted, and the episode cost them roughly two weeks of stress and legal fees that a properly scoped due diligence process would have avoided entirely. Wojciech gave up part of his closing proceeds to the holdback and had to cooperate with underwriting requests he had not expected to field after selling the business. Both sides gave something up to get a deal that worked.

Cristina and Jacek have now run the facility for several months. The tenant insurance program is fully underwritten in their own name, and the revenue it generates has come in close to the projections that first surfaced the problem. They still use the same accountant, but the deal consultant who missed the insurance question at the outset is no longer part of their team; Cristina has said, plainly, that the gap between what a general business advisor checks and what a transaction actually requires is the lesson she paid for.

The holdback released to Wojciech in full once the new program's confirmation letter arrived, a little over three weeks after closing, and the file closed out without further dispute between the parties, with Wojciech's cooperation on the underwriting requests turning out to be genuine rather than grudging once the incentive was in place. Jacek now reviews the insurer's renewal notices personally each year, a small habit that traces directly back to the nine days when nobody was watching the calendar.

What you can learn from this

  • When you buy a business that runs any kind of insurance program for customers or tenants, ask early whether that program transfers with the sale or has to be rewritten from scratch under new ownership.
  • A deal consultant who is not a lawyer may review financials and walk a property without ever checking who holds the underlying contracts a business depends on to operate legally the day after closing.
  • Insurance underwriting on a new owner does not happen overnight; if your closing date is fixed, ask about interim or bridging coverage well before the final week rather than after a gap is discovered.
  • A closing holdback tied to a specific post-closing condition, like a new policy going active, gives a seller a real incentive to keep helping after the money has technically changed hands.
  • Read the actual customer or tenant contracts, not just the seller's summary of them, before assuming who bears the risk of a gap; the real exposure is often narrower or wider than either side assumes.
This case study is entirely fictional. It does not describe any real client, file, or matter handled by Treadstone Law, and it is not a real file with details changed. All names, people, properties, businesses, dollar amounts, dates, and events are invented, and any resemblance to a real person, business, or situation is coincidental. Fictional scenarios like this one illustrate the kinds of legal issues people in Ontario commonly face and how a lawyer can help. They are general information, not legal advice — no two matters unfold the same way, and nothing here predicts the outcome of any real case. Reading a case study does not create a lawyer-client relationship. If you are facing something similar, speak with a lawyer about your specific circumstances.

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